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BACKGROUND 
 
 On July 22, 2015 HMRC published a consultation document which set out 
three proposals to deal with perceived challenges posed by the tax practices 
of some large businesses.1 The proposals are: 
 
(1) A legislative requirement for all large businesses to publish their tax 
strategy, enabling public scrutiny of their approach towards tax planning and 
tax compliance;  
 
(2) A voluntary ‘Code of Practice on Taxation for Large Business’ (the Code) 
which sets out the behaviours which HMRC expects from its large business 
customers;  
 
(3) A narrowly targeted ‘Special Measures’ regime to tackle the small number 
of large businesses that persistently undertake aggressive tax planning, or 
refuse to engage with HMRC in an open and collaborative manner.  
 
 The Consultation Document has been presented as part of the fight against 
tax avoidance, incentivizing the ‘right behaviour’ and ensuring that 
‘aggressive tax planners’ are tackled in order to create and maintain a level 
playing field for the vast majority of businesses.2   It is put forward as a 
continuation of the co-operative compliance mode of working.  
 
 These objectives chime with the current political climate and have been 
presented carefully in such a way as to appear beneficial both to the public 
and to the majority of businesses.  It is necessary, however, to examine the 
detail of the proposals to ensure that they do contribute to good tax 
governance and achieve their objectives in the long term.  A system based on 
trust, such as the co-operative compliance programme, can be undermined 
by the introduction of certain types and levels of sanction: the balance and 
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dynamic is a complex one.3 Tax morale amongst business, but also more 
generally, could suffer in the long run from taking a short-term view. It is on 
good tax morale that all tax systems rely to achieve high levels of voluntary 
compliance from the vast majority of taxpayers, so that threats to that 
relationship would be to the detriment of long-term revenue collection. 
 
 There is an overriding need for any tax system to be governed by the rule of 
law if it is to gain and maintain the confidence of taxpayers and the public.4  
Tax authorities undoubtedly require discretion to run a modern, complex tax 
system. However, if the discretion given to officials goes beyond what is 
required to run the tax system fairly, efficiently and effectively, the system 
will ultimately run into difficulties. Furthermore, and critically, officials must 
be careful not to exceed the discretion granted to them and adequate 
controls must be in place to ensure this. Authority for all actions and 
decisions must come from a proper source and, in the case of taxation, this 
should be the legislature. This is the case whether discretion is exercised by 
officials too heavily in favour of taxpayers (perceived ‘sweetheart deals’) or 
too heavily against taxpayers (attempts to go beyond the proper 
interpretation of the law as enacted by the legislature and interpreted by the 
courts). This takes us to another aspect of the rule of law- ‘the law must be 
capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects’.5 Taxpayers are entitled to 
expect that they can rely on the law in the books when making their 
decisions in what can be very complex commercial situations, where precise 
costing is vital in assessing the viability of a transaction or arrangement.  
 
 This analysis of the Consultation Document considers the need to balance the 
necessary use of discretion under the powers of care and management 
bestowed by the Taxes Acts on HMRC against the need for the application of 
the tax system to be at all times subject to a clear legal framework. This is not 
an argument for literal interpretation of tax law- the UK courts have long ago 
moved away from this in any event, and HMRC’s armoury includes many 
forms of anti-avoidance provisions, including the General Anti-abuse Rule, 
which should re-enforce the ability to defeat attempts at twisting the 
meaning of legislation.6  Many examples of taxpayers avoiding tax are old and 
                                                        
3
 Gangl, Hofmann, Pollai and Kirchler, “The Dynamics of Power and Trust in the ‘Slippery Slope 
Framework’ and its Impact on the Tax Climate” (2012) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2024946 
4
 The term ‘rule of law’ is often defined to mean that government should govern by known rules 
rather than by whim or discretion (Dicey and others). A more modern manifestation is, as put forward 
by Tomkins, that the executive may do nothing without clear legal authority permitting its actions - an 
authority that in the case of taxation we would expect to see coming from the legislature. For further 
discussion see Freedman and Vella, ‘HMRC’s Management of the U.K. Tax System: The Boundaries of 
Legitimate Discretion’ in C Evans, J Freedman and R Krever (eds), The Delicate Balance: Revenue 
Authority Discretions and the Rule of Law, IBFD, (2011). 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2174946 
5
 Raz, , The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (OUP, 2nd ed., 2009), ch. 11 (“The Rule of 
Law and its Virtue”). 
6
 See for example Lord Steyn’s discussion about this shift from literal interpretation in the tax context 
in IRC v McGuckian  [1997] STC 908. 
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would not succeed under current law. What is argued here is simply that the 
law to be applied is that created by parliament and interpreted by the courts. 
This is not to deny that tax law is frequently hard to interpret and they may 
be a range of possible answers. It is also clear that, if the Government is not 
happy that the law is as it wishes it to be, it can and should go through proper 
legislative processes to change it. But recent anti-avoidance legislation 
already in place should reduce the need to play cat and mouse with tax 
legislation.  
 
 Much good work has been done to establish the existing co-operative 
compliance regime and this is a positive development for business, HMRC 
and the wider public, in that it increases the ability of the tax administration 
to collect revenue efficiently. Surveys and analysis undertaken by the Oxford 
University Centre for Business Taxation (CBT) suggest that this regime has on 
the whole worked well to improve, transparency, speed of resolution and 
understanding of commercial issues amongst the population covered by the 
Large Business Service.7 There is a risk that some of the current proposals 
would undermine the concept of relationships based on trust and actually 
reduce the amount of information coming to HMRC.  
 
 Overall, the authors have reservations about Proposal 1 and concerns about 
the direction in which Proposals 2 and 3 take the relationship between 
HMRC and Large Business. Proposals 2 and 3 appear to be at odds with the 
basic tenets of the UK cooperative compliance programme. Also, they 
appear to be yet further measures designed to move from the boundary 
drawn by law to a boundary drawn by HMRC. The fact that this latter 
boundary drawn by HMRC may equate with the views of some politicians, 
or a perceived view of the public and the media, does not make this an 
appropriate boundary for the operation of a tax system within the rule of 
law.  
 
PROPOSAL 1 
 
A legislative requirement for all large businesses to publish their tax strategy, 
enabling public scrutiny of their approach towards tax planning and tax compliance. 
 
i. Benefits and disadvantages  of adopting a tax strategy 
 
 There could be some benefits in companies adopting a formal tax strategy. In a 
survey undertaken by CBT researchers in 20088 a number of tax directors 
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 See J Freedman, F Ng and J Vella, ‘HMRC’s relationship with large business’, (2014) Oxford University 
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4 
 
expressed the view that such strategies could focus the mind on how tax and tax 
risk is managed within a company. Clearly, such strategies, if approved by the 
board of directors, could also ensure that tax issues are discussed at the highest 
governance levels within the company.  
 
 This discussion of strategy does not, of course, determine the outcome of those 
deliberations. In the current climate one would expect some directors to be keen 
to avoid reputational risk, but this will depend on the type of firm concerned. In 
our 2008 survey we reported that “... a few interviewees noted that board 
engagement can have the opposite effect [ie can encourage tax minimization 
attempts] as a result of the so-called ‘golf course syndrome’”. In other words, in 
some cases the board of directors has been keener to minimize tax than the tax 
advisers and directors were. This could be partly driven by investor preference on 
these issues. A recent survey by Allen & Overy in fact explained that “[w]hile 
some investors are most focused on transparency, reputation and ensuring 
stability of the tax position, for many it is simply a question of minimising leakage 
on their returns.”9 
 
 It may be that the process of discussing the strategy is helpful, and revealing it to 
HMRC could then be a requirement to ensure that this discussion had taken 
place, but this does not of itself demand publication to the public. It is not clear 
that such a requirement will result in the development of a serious strategy 
rather than a public relations document. Thus the publication requirement could 
reduce the usefulness of this document. 
 
 The Consultation Document sets out the underlying thinking behind this proposal 
and the reputational channel through which it is hoped this change in behaviour 
will be achieved:  
 
“Our most recent research into large businesses (also published today) tells us 
that the degree of codification and content of a tax strategy are ‘clear indicators 
of aggressiveness’ in tax planning. The research found that ‘businesses with a 
greater appetite for risk tend[ed] not to have written (or published) tax strategies, 
while those with lower risk-appetite tended to have more formalised strategies.’ 
This research also shows that reputational concerns can influence the attitudes 
of large businesses and encourage them to pursue less aggressive tax planning 
arrangements.”10 
                                                        
9
  Allen & Overy ‘Negotiating the minefield: challenges facing the corporate tax 
function’.http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Global_Tax_Challenges%20facing%2
0the%20corporate%20tax%20function.pdf 
10
   ‘Exploring Large Business Tax Strategy Behaviour’ TNS BMRB Final Report HMRC Research Report 
363 July 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/444898/HMRC_Res
earch_Report_363_-_Exploring_Large_Business_Tax_Behaviours.pdf. This was a survey from a sample 
drawn by HMRC of 35 individuals with a strategic decision making role in tax in large companies from 
the LBS population. 12 were higher risk, 7 medium risk and 16 lower risk. This is small and not 
necessarily representative sample upon which to base a new legislative requirement.  
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 This appears to confuse correlation with causation. It may be true that 
companies that have a lower risk appetite tend to have formalized tax strategies, 
however, it does not follow, as a matter of logic, that requiring companies with a 
higher risk appetite to adopt formal tax strategies, without more, will induce 
them to reduce their risk appetite.  
 
 Tax strategies can be drafted in carefully selected vague language that is open to 
interpretation. Statements such as “we pay all taxes due under the law”, “we do 
not undertake artificial tax planning which is devoid of commercial reality”, and 
“we respect both the letter and the spirit of the law” can allow behaviour of 
varying degrees of aggressiveness depending on the interpreter’s particular 
understanding of these statements. Companies adopting such loosely worded 
statements need not feel constrained in their tax planning behaviour. For this 
reason, a formal requirement to adopt such strategies may well not produce its 
desired effect with the most recalcitrant firms, which are those the Government 
is concerned to target.   
 
 
ii. The content of the tax strategy 
 
 The final point above assumes that the content of tax strategies will not be 
prescribed by HMRC. This is implied in the current Consultation Document, as it 
currently only provides “suggested elements” (para. 2.2). 
  
 Clearly, if the required tax strategy were to have a prescribed content the 
proposal would be of a different nature. If, for example, companies were 
required by law to include statements as to whether they aim to comply with the 
“spirit of the law” as defined by HMRC and discussed below, this might be 
thought to be a stronger version of Proposal 2. However, companies might be 
prepared to state this to be the case on the basis that in their view following the 
law covers following the spirit of the law. Since all companies must abide by the 
law in any event, this would not add anything.  
 
 A requirement to include such matters as target effective tax rates (ETR) would 
be very problematic, since such targets, where they exist, are likely to be global 
and in any event there may be many different reasons for the ETR in any given 
year. Therefore this is unlikely to be workable or useful.  
 
 A requirement to state whether the taxpayer had signed up to the Code would 
remove the Code from the realms of the voluntary, as discussed below, and 
would be likely to lead to demands for more information about the operation of 
the Code.  
 
 
 
iii. Publication of the tax strategy 
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 The Consultation Document places this proposal in the content of other recent 
proposed measures to increase transparency. A critical design feature of these 
measures is whether disclosure is made to revenue authorities or the public at 
large. Current proposals by the OECD for country-by-country reporting and 
disclosure of tax rulings have been limited to the former. The Consultation 
Document does not explain why this proposal adopts a different approach, and 
requires disclosure to the public at large.  
 
 One possible reason is that such tax strategies contain less sensitive information 
than that found in country-by-country reports and tax rulings. Indeed, this 
follows from their potentially vague and anodyne nature. Also for this reason, 
objections to public disclosure may be less compelling here. 
 
 Equally, one has to question what is being achieved by placing information of this 
kind in the hands of the public and the NGOS. It could lead to misunderstandings 
and will certainly add cost for companies, which will have to employ experts to 
advise on content and presentation. The benefits to the public are unclear 
particularly if there is no requirement to publish specific information, although 
that would in turn bring about the issues discussed above. If reputational 
pressures were to arise from varying presentations of tax strategy, there is a 
strong likelihood that they would apply differentially across the body of 
taxpayers partly depending on their exposure to the retail market.  
 
 It seems that the most likely outcome of this requirement may be to create work 
for tax advisers and PR firms rather than increasing the amount of tax collected.  
 
 This proposal is projected to raise £65m by 2017, but it is not clear how this 
figure could have been reached- it seems speculative.  
 
 If, after discussion and consultation, it is thought that any particular piece of 
information should be published, this should be specified in legislation, so that a 
level playing field is created. 
 
 
iv. Accountability for the tax strategy 
 
The Consultation Document explains that a member of the Board of Directors will 
be “responsible for owning and signing off the tax strategy.” It is not clear 
whether HMRC envisages that a breach of the strategy will carry consequences 
for the director and what those consequences would be. 
 
v. Where is this intended to lead?  
 
The Consultation Document suggests that failure to adopt and publish a tax 
strategy will be met with a penalty. As we have explained, we think this could 
lead to great cost without much, if any, gain. However, failure to comply to 
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HMRC’s satisfaction with an adopted tax strategy will only be considered for the 
purposes of risk rating. No further consequence is currently envisaged. If further 
sanctions were to be introduced (and there is evidence from the Code of Practice 
for Banks that this kind of development can take place), it would be important to 
be more precise about the requirements, as suggested above.  
 
 
PROPOSAL 2 
 
A voluntary ‘Code of Practice on Taxation for Large Business’, which sets out the 
behaviours which HMRC expects from its large business customers. 
 
The Code of Practice on Taxation for Large Business (the Code) covers three 
broad areas of large business behaviour: 
 
 Openness and the relationship of the business with HMRC 
 Internal Governance 
 The approach of the business to tax planning.  
 
We focus here on the third area, “the approach of the business to tax planning”, 
although many of our general points about the discretion any such Code 
envisages HMRC exercising hold for all three.  
 
 
 
i. Beyond the boundary of the law. 
 
 The Code requires companies to: 
“Avoid structuring transactions in a way which will have tax results that are 
inconsistent with the underlying economic consequences unless there exists 
specific legislation designed to give that result. In all cases, the business should 
reasonably believe that transactions are structured in a way that gives a tax 
result which is not contrary to the intentions of Parliament.” 
HMRC’s understanding of the phrase “intentions of Parliament” is explained in 
the following definition of tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning 
accompanying the Code: 
“In arriving at a view as to whether the transaction is contrary to the intentions 
of Parliament, HMRC will consider a purposive construction of the legislation, and 
will also consider whether Parliament can realistically have intended to give the 
proposed result in circumstances that are very different from those that 
prevailed at the time (e.g. re loopholes being used to arrive at an unexpected 
result).”11  
 An identical provision is found in the Code of Practice for Banks (the Bank Code). 
It assumed that the identically phrased provisions are intended to have the same 
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meaning. HMRC have explained the meaning of the provision in the Bank Code in 
the following terms: 
“In arriving at a view as to whether the transaction is contrary to the intentions 
of Parliament, the bank should not only consider a purposive construction of the 
legislation but should also consider whether Parliament can realistically have 
intended to give the proposed result in circumstances that are very different 
from those that existed at the time (e.g. are loopholes being used to arrive at an 
unexpected result). The question of whether the tax results are contrary to the 
intentions of Parliament can be answered in practice by asking whether the tax 
consequences of a proposed transaction are too good to be true. The 
Government has a track record of acting to close avoidance opportunities of 
which it becomes aware.” 12 
 
“…we will suggest banks answer the question of whether the transaction is 
contrary to the “intentions of Parliament” in practice by asking whether the tax 
consequences of a proposed transaction are too good to be true, so that the tax 
consequences would be a surprise to HMRC. This is because a tax result contrary 
to the “intentions of Parliament” would not be what HMRC would expect.”13 
 
 By requiring banks to comply with this understanding of the intention of 
Parliament the Code and the Bank Code (the Codes) appear to require companies 
to go beyond the requirements of the law.14 In a sense, this can be seen as a 
matter of simple logic. The Codes would have very little purpose if all they did 
was to commit companies to comply with the law when planning their tax affairs.  
 
 That the Codes commit companies to go beyond the requirements of the law 
emerges from the definition given to the “intention of Parliament”. This differs 
from the meaning used generally in law. This proper constitutional usage of the 
phrase “intention of Parliament” makes the intention of Parliament a matter for 
the Courts to decide.15 In reaching their decision, the Courts in the UK, as in most 
other jurisdictions, already follow a purposive interpretation of statutes, meaning 
that they do not merely follow the letter of the law, but they also look at the 
context of the particular provision in terms of the purpose of the statute as a 
whole. The proposed Code encompasses that, but that adds nothing, as 
companies are already required to adopt such an interpretation and any lawyer 
advising them should do so. 
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 HMRC, A Code of Practice on Taxation for banks - Supplementary Guidance Note, 9 December 2009, 
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 The proposed Code then requires companies to go beyond this and “also 
consider whether Parliament can realistically have intended to give the proposed 
result in circumstances that are very different from those that prevailed at the 
time (e.g. re loopholes being used to arrive at an unexpected result)”. This 
further step is not undertaken by the Courts when interpreting statutes and, 
therefore, the proposed Code is committing companies to go beyond the 
demands of the law. It commits companies to refrain from a transaction even in a 
case where the company believes that there is a good argument that it is 
compliant with the law (an argument which a court might well accept). In other 
words, the proposed Code would require companies to arrange their affairs in 
line with the law as interpreted by HMRC or as HMRC would like it to be, rather 
than as it is.  
 
 There is an interesting contrast with the legislative General Anti-abuse Rule 
(GAAR) here. The GAAR does allow the courts to look at shortcomings in the 
legislation, but only in certain prescribed circumstances, and subject to 
safeguards. These safeguards were set out as a matter of policy to protect 
taxpayers. It would seem strange if taxpayers were expected to go further than 
this carefully delineated boundary.  We would have no problem with a code that 
required companies to consider whether the GAAR would apply, since that is 
required by law in any event, but a requirement that companies consider what 
Parliament would have intended in different circumstances, without the various 
safeguards deemed necessary for the GAAR, clearly goes beyond what was 
thought appropriate by Parliament after considerable discussion and 
consultation, in 2013.   
 
 Some of the wider concerns of the general public and politicians over what are 
seen as deficiencies in international taxation can clearly be dealt with only by 
changing the specific rules, as is happening in co-operation with other 
jurisdictions through the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) process. 
The Code might give the public a misleading impression that these issues can be 
dealt with more easily. A voluntary Code would clearly not be an effective way of 
dealing with matters which have been in place for many years - only changes to 
legislation and treaties can be expected to achieve that result.  
 
 
ii. Consequences for failing to sign or breaching the Code. 
 
 The Consultation Document is very careful in differentiating the Code from the 
Bank Code (see para. 3.7 et seq). Whilst both Codes are “voluntary” failure to 
adopt or comply with the Bank Code can result in the bank being named and 
shamed, but no such consequences are foreseen for a failure to adopt or comply 
with the Code. Non-adoption or breach of the Code would be used only in the 
context of the existing risk management approach. These statements must be 
read in the context of the rest of the document, however, and in the light of the 
development of the Bank Code.  
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 Too much attention can be given to the term “voluntary”. HMRC have defended 
the use of the term “voluntary” to describe the Bank Code despite the fact that 
the 15 largest banks operating in the UK were given a deadline by the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer within which to sign up to it and despite the introduction of 
legislation which allows HMRC, following a set of procedures, to name and 
shame banks which do not adopt or breach it.  One can clearly take issue with the 
use of “voluntary” to describe such a measure, however the label used to 
describe either of the two Codes is ultimately less important than whether and 
what type of consequences flow from the non-adoption or breach of these Codes. 
 
 HMRC explain that the non-adoption or breach of the Code would be 
“considered indicators of higher-risk behaviour.”16 HMRC explain that “unlike the 
Bank Code, HMRC does not intend to name (or otherwise publish information on) 
signatories to, or compliance with, the Code, or otherwise identify which 
businesses are or are not signatories.”17 However, when HMRC introduced the 
Bank Code it also did not intend naming and shaming non-signatories or banks 
which breached the code. The gradual strengthening of consequences for the 
non-adoption or breach of the Bank Code justify concerns that the same 
trajectory will be followed with the Code.  
 
 The Code behaviours are those which HMRC already expects from its large 
business customers - “the Code simply provides a formal avenue for businesses 
to commit to meeting this standard”.18 In this case it is hard to see what is added 
by the Code. The introduction of the Code may be seen as a move towards 
formalising co-operative compliance, as is done in the Netherlands with 
individual compliance agreements with each company covered by the approach. 
But this is done within a context where all large companies have already 
undergone risk rating and many are already working with HMRC in an open and 
transparent way. 
 
 It is possible that the consequences attaching to the failure to sign the Code 
might go beyond mere indications of higher-risk behaviour. As seen, the 
Consultation Document also proposes a legal requirement for large businesses to 
publish a legal strategy. Paragraph 2.31 explains that HMRC are considering 
requiring business “to state in their published tax strategy whether they are a 
signatory to this Code.” If this were to be required legislatively, it would be 
tantamount to a name and shame approach for companies who do not sign the 
Code.  
 
 Failure to comply with the standards set out in the Code could have significant 
consequences, whether or not the company is a signatory to the Code.19 Under 
Proposal 3, a company which fails consistently to comply with these standards 
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 Code para. 3.24. 
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 Code para. 3.8. 
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 Code para. 3.15. 
19
 Code para. 4.22. 
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will be at risk of entering into a Special Measures regime. Once in that regime, a 
further trigger will result in meaningful penalties being imposed on the company. 
 
 
iii.  The Rule of Law 
 
 Imposing meaningful consequences on companies which do not commit to go 
beyond the requirements of the law is in tension with the rule of law. Even 
without naming and shaming, there could be meaningful consequences as a 
result of not signing the Code, especially if this fact is to be published as part of a 
compulsorily published tax strategy. This goes further than mere allocation of 
resources to higher risk taxpayers, which is within the powers of HMRC in 
administering the tax system.  
 
 When the Bank Code was first proposed, the Financial Market Law Committee, 
chaired by Lord Hoffmann, issued a note which took the view that the Bank Code 
was in tension with the rule of law. At the time the proposed consequences for a 
failure to adopt or a breach of the Code included being considered high risk and 
reporting the failure to the board of directors or to an outside professional body. 
Naming and shaming banks/companies is clearly a stronger sanction so these 
arguments would apply to the current version of the Bank Code (and possibly the 
Code) with additional force: 
 
 
“The principal objection to the Code is that it appears to blur the boundaries 
between notifying signatories in advance of the way in which HMRC’s 
administrative discretion will be used and setting new (and uncertain) rules for 
compliance with the general law on taxation.” 
 
The note goes on to say that to the extent that any consequence “is intended to 
be—or to be experienced as—a punitive one it can be objected that HMRC is 
going beyond the mere exercise of an administrative discretion. In this case the 
Code serves as more than simply notice of how that discretion is to be used…” 
 
The note is particularly scathing about the reference in the Bank Code to the 
‘intention of Parliament’, saying  
“ It does not appear to this Committee that there are any other circumstances in 
which it would be considered legitimate for an agency of the executive to require 
citizens to comply, not just with the law as it exists, but with the law as the 
executive would like it to be and to police this requirement with potentially 
stringent sanctions. While it is recognised that tax planning and tax avoidance are 
currently emotive political issues, it does not appear to the FMLC that these are 
sufficient grounds to justify such a significant departure from well- established 
“rule of law” values such as: a) the law must be clear and ascertainable so that 
citizens can govern their conduct according to its precepts; and b) citizens are 
entitled to expect that administrative decisions will be applied to them on the 
12 
 
same basis.”20   
This appears to have application to the proposed Code to the extent that failure 
to sign it, or to abide by it, might lead to something more than a greater focus on 
the affairs of the company, as would fall within the risk rating regime anyway.  
 
 
PROPOSAL 3 
 
A narrowly targeted ‘Special Measures’ regime to tackle the small number of 
large businesses that persistently undertake aggressive tax planning, or refuse to 
engage with HMRC in an open and collaborative manner.  
 
 Although it has probably received the least attention in the debates around the 
consultation, Proposal 3 may be the most worrying of all in concept because it 
involves the most serious sanctions. The Consultation Document and surrounding 
discussion are at pains to emphasise that this proposal is intended to affect only 
a very small number of companies. This is reassuring to the majority of 
companies, which are broadly complaint in any event. But the provisions will be 
on the statute book and the underlying assumptions give rise to concerns. 
Provisions intended to apply narrowly can be found to affect taxpayers beyond 
their original intended scope and can also be used more extensively in the future, 
when their origins might have been forgotten.  
 
 Under the existing model of the UK cooperative compliance programme 
companies are free to place themselves anywhere on the risk spectrum and to 
have HMRC respond accordingly. However, HMRC encourage companies to move 
towards the lower end of the spectrum, partly by offering a number of benefits 
for being low risk. Proposal 3 appears to depart from the current cooperative 
compliance model which is based on encouragement and incentives. Under this 
proposal, companies which repeatedly engage in behaviour which places them in 
the high-risk category are placed in a Special Measures regime and if their 
behaviour sets off another trigger, they will be subject to sanctions. The carrot of 
benefits following from a low risk rating is being replaced by the special 
measures stick.  
 
 This suggests, as predicted by these authors in previous work, 21 that the benefits 
of being low risk would not suffice to make some of the most recalcitrant 
companies change their tax planning behaviour. It can be questioned, however, 
whether the basis of the co-operative compliance relationship should be put in 
jeopardy to deal with the currently targeted very small number of companies. 
 
 The argument made above that the Code appears to be in tension with the rule 
of law can be made even more strongly for Proposal 3, given that under this 
                                                        
20
 Financial Markets Law Committee, Response to the June 2009 HMRC Consultation Document on a 
Code of Practice for Banks. October 2009.   
21
 Freedman, Loomer and Vella, supra, pp. 88-89.  
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proposal persistent failure to follow HMRC’s understanding of the intention of 
Parliament could be a step towards the Special Measures regime, with penalties 
resulting. 
 
 The proposed Special Measures regime has two strands to deal with  
 
o Lack of transparency and cooperation with HMRC (Strand A) and 
o Persistent and aggressive tax planning. 22 (Strand B) 
 
 
 Legislation will be used to define whether companies should be put into an 
‘Initial Notice Period’. This will happen if they are judged to present a ‘significant 
risk to the Exchequer’. 
 
 The suggested criteria for judging this include: 
 
“That it is reasonable for HMRC to take the view that the business presents a 
significant risk due to: 
 
o the significant number of occasions on which a business has 
               entered into tax avoidance schemes within a specified period 
             (whether or not they have been successful in avoiding tax) and/or; 
             
o the nature of those schemes (for example, the extent to which 
     they represent contrived or abnormal arrangements); …” 
(authors’ bold)  
 
 Other criteria are also considered, but as this proposal is set out in the 
Consultation Document, it is the case that a company could find itself on notice 
for entering into a number of tax arrangements that have been upheld as 
effective by the courts. It should be noted that the fact that schemes are 
contrived or abnormal might be a factor in the courts deciding that they are 
ineffective, but if the courts have found the schemes to be successful 
notwithstanding these factors, the taxpayer should not be penalised, although it 
would be reasonable to change the law to meet the expectations of HMRC in the 
future. 
 
 It is true that such behaviour only puts the company in question on notice. It 
then has 12 months to improve its behaviour. If it has not improved by then, it 
will enter the special measures regime, after which it will be at risk of triggering 
sanctions.23 It is not clear whether there is to be any appeal against this step 
being taken. 
 
                                                        
22
 Consultation Document, para.4.7. 
23
 Ibid, para 4.28. 
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 Being placed in the Special Measures regime – for a minimum of two years24 – is 
a meaningful consequence. Once in the regime, the company will face sanctions 
if it sets off a trigger. The proposed triggers are somewhat unclear, but the 
document seems to suggest that no sanctions could follow without a judicial 
decision, although only where “this is part of the existing process”. That suggests 
that some sanctions might follow without a judicial decision, especially under 
Strand A. 
 
 Leaving that question to one side, sanctions might follow on from the issuing of a 
Tribunal information notice leading to sanctions within Strand A or a Tribunal or 
court decision that a scheme had been defeated, leading to sanctions within 
Strand B.25 The document does not make clear whether the taxpayer has to be 
party to the court decision in question or whether it could be argued that a 
similar scheme had been defeated, although we understand that the intention is 
that the taxpayer should itself be a party to such litigation for it to act as a trigger.   
 
 The potential sanctions are serious. They include increased reporting and 
disclosure requirements and public naming by HMRC under Strand A. The 
potential penalties under Strand B are even greater and include one very 
worrying feature: not only would there be  public naming but also  
 
“An inability to rely on the defence of “reasonable care” within Schedule 24 of 
Finance Act 2007, and therefore the charging of any penalties on the basis that 
the behaviour was at least careless, if not deliberate”26 
 
 The removal of a reasonable care defence shows a mistrust in the courts, which 
can hear all the evidence and decide whether there was reasonable care taken or 
not. In such cases it may seem unlikely that there was reasonable care, but this 
should be left to the courts to decide. The problem may be around legal 
professional privilege. Taxpayers can rely on legal opinions which they are not 
obliged to disclose. If that is the problem at the root of this then it should be 
tackled at source, rather than removing the entire defence from a class of 
taxpayers.  
 
 Under these proposals, a company which is not in the Special Regime that enters 
into a transaction which is defeated will not face these sanctions in the same way. 
It can be seen, therefore, that non-compliance with HMRC’s interpretation of the 
law (and the resulting entry into the Special Regime) could have very meaningful 
consequences under Proposal 3.  
 
 It would be possible for a company that falls out with HMRC over a number of 
schemes, and then loses in the courts on one scheme only, to lose its defence of 
reasonable care and to be named and shamed. We do not expect this to be a real 
                                                        
24
 Ibid, para. 4.36. 
25
 Ibid para. 4.35. 
26
 Ibid para 4.32. 
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danger at present for many companies, but we do believe that the notion that 
special treatment can be aimed at those entering into schemes that  HMRC 
dislikes, but that are upheld by the courts, is in tension with the rule of law. We 
also consider that a defence of reasonable care, inserted into the penalty regime 
by Parliament for good reason, should apply equally to all taxpayers. If it is not 
considered robust enough for the courts to operate appropriately, then there 
should be changes to the penalty regime as a whole rather than removing what 
on the face of it seems to be a sensible defence from a particular group of 
taxpayers only.  
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